Hofstra Property Law Journal
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 10

3-1-1988

Supreme Court Land Use Rulings: Responsible
Controls Are Not Endangered
David Doheny
Paul W. Edmondson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hplj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Doheny, David and Edmondson, Paul W. (1988) "Supreme Court Land Use Rulings: Responsible Controls Are Not Endangered,"
Hofstra Property Law Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hplj/vol1/iss1/10

This A Practitioner's Symposium on the Recent Supreme Court Taking Cases is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at
Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Property Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For
more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

SUPREME COURT LAND USE RULINGS:
RESPONSIBLE CONTROLS ARE NOT
ENDANGERED
David Doheny* & Paul W. Edmondson**
If you choose to believe the advocates of unrestrained development, two recent Supreme Court decisions have sounded a deathknell for land-use controls. The prospect of large damage awards for
regulatory takings, it is said, will paralyze governmental efforts to
enact or apply environmental protections, building height and density limits, and even public-safety restrictions on the use of land.
Some have even suggested that local officials, fearing the invalidity
of historic preservation controls, will be powerless to prevent the
rampant destruction of important historic resources.
In reality, the only cause for alarm is that the holdings of the
two cases have been so misrepresented that these predictions will become self-fulfilling. The two decisions are First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,1 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.' The cases clearly do favor the interests of
property owners and developers. But both cases are relatively limited
in scope, and should also be limited in effect.
In First English, the Court addressed the narrow question of
what remedy is available to a property owner, assuming that a governmental regulation has been invalidated as a taking "of all use" of
his or her property. 8 The word "assume" is Chief Justice Rehnquist's
because the Court explicitly did not decide whether the specific governmental action challenged in the case (a temporary emergency ban
* David Doheny is Vice President and General Counsel for the National Trust for Historic Preservation. L.L.B. 1958, Harvard College; A.B. 1953, Williams College. The National
Trust For Historic Preservation took the lead role in preparing an amicus brief in the First
English case for 10 national preservation and conservation organizations.
** Paul W. Edmondson is Assistant General Counsel for the National Trust for Historic
Preservation. J.D. 1981, American University School of Law; A.B. 1976, Cornell University.
1. 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
2. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
3. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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on construction in a floodplain area) actually resulted in a "taking of
all use" of the plaintiff's property. The Court held that compensation
is an available remedy if a regulatory taking of all use of property
can be proved. The case has now been sent back to the California
courts to decide the merits of the taking question. Most land-use experts believe that the California courts will have no difficulty under
existing Court precedents in finding that there was in fact no taking.
It is essential to recognize that the First English decision in no
manner addressed, much less changed, the law as to what types of
land-use restrictions constitute takings of private property. This is a
message lost on many. Opponents of governmental land-use controls, in describing the case, have conveniently forgotten that the
courts have consistently been reluctant to strike down land-use ordinances under takings challenges. In particular, predictions of damage awards arising from judicial invalidation of historic preservation
ordinances simply fly in the face of numerous court opinions upholding such controls, including the Supreme Court's "landmark" 1978
decision, upholding New York City's historic preservation ordinance
under a takings challenge, Penn Central Corp. v. New York City.4
The real question then, is whether the second Supreme Court decision-the Nollan case-represents any major departure in the
Court's view as to what types of governmental controls constitute
takings of private property for public use. The answer appears to be
that the case does not signal any major change in the law, although
it indicates the Court's intention to take a closer look at whether
land-use controls actually further the governmental interests it purports to promote.
In Nollan, the Court addressed the validity of a state requirement that, in return for permission to build on their property, landowners must grant the public a right of access over a beachfront
portion of their land. The Court's inquiry focused on whether the
particular restriction in the case actually furthered its stated governmental purpose. According to the view of the majority, the stated
purpose of the restriction, improved access to the beach, was not
substantially furthered by the permit's condition for an easement
along the beach. 5 The Court was careful not to back away from the
basic principle, laid out in earlier decisions, such as Penn Central,
that governmental controls on the use of land are not takings if they
4.
5.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
107 S. Ct. at 3149.
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substantially further legitimate governmental purposes and do not
deny the owner the economically viable use of the land. If there is
any departure from those earlier cases, it is only that the Court can
no longer be expected to take at face value the statements of local
government officials that the burdens imposed by land-use controls in
any particular case are necessary to meet the burdens the development imposes on legitimate public interests. Nonetheless, this
stricter scrutiny should not have an adverse effect on the overwhelming majority of land-use restrictions, including historic preservation
ordinances. Unless controls have been imposed without adequate justification, they are unlikely to be successfully challenged.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
First English DOES NOT AFFECT VALIDITY OF HISTORIC
PRESERVATION ORDINANCES

A).

INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday, June 9, 1987, the United States Supreme Court
issued its opinion in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles.6 The decision has important implications for
all aspects of land use planning, but has no effect on the validity of
historic preservation ordinances.
In First English, the Supreme Court addressed the narrow
question of what remedy is available to a property owner, assuming
that a governmental regulation has been invalidated as a taking of
all use of his or her property. The Court held that the affected property owner has a right to be compensated for any temporary loss of
"all use of property" between the time that the regulation results in
a denial of all use and the time that the regulation is invalidated.
The significance of First English relates to the fact that it expands
the remedies available for governmental actions determined to constitute uncompensated takings of private property for public use.
Consequently, it is likely to provide additional incentives for challenges to all types of land use regulation. Nonetheless, it is essential
to recognize that the case does not in any manner change the law as
to what types of actions constitute takings of private property. Because preservation ordinances have consistently been upheld by the
courts (including the United States Supreme Court) against takings
6.

107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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challenges,7 the First English decision should not discourage local
governments from enacting or applying such controls.

B).

FACTS

In February 1978, Mill Creek Canyon in Los Angeles County
was devastated by a flood, killing 10 people. The flood destroyed a
substantial amount of property in the canyon, including "Lutherglen," a retreat center and recreational area for handicapped children. In response to the flood, the County of Los Angeles in early
1979 enacted a temporary emergency moratorium on construction or
reconstruction in a designated flood protection area within the canyon. A permanent ordinance, enacted in 1981, maintained strict controls but permitted certain types of construction.
The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,
the owner of Lutherglen, sued the county for damages, alleging
among other things, that the county's ordinance had denied the
church "all use" of its property. The County of Los Angeles responded that even if the challenged ordinance had denied the church
all use of the property (without conceding that allegation to be true),
the sole legal remedy was invalidation of the ordinance rather than
compensation for the denial. Thus, the county argued that the compensation claim should be dismissed. The California courts agreed
with this argument, based on an earlier decision of the California
Supreme Court, Agins v. Tiburon," The plaintiffs eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Before the Supreme
Court, the church argued that the rule applied by the California
courts was contrary to the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. The fifth amendment, made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth, provides that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation. The county responded, first, that the actions taken with regard to the plaintiff's
property had not constituted a taking of all use, and second that the
proper remedy for a temporary regulatory taking-when proven-is
invalidation, not damages. The county's position was supported by
the National Trust and a number of other conservation and environmental groups, appearing as friends of the court. These parties also
cited earlier court cases to the effect that, when required for reasons
of health and safety, the government may prevent a property owner
7. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
8. 24 Cal. 3d. 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affd on other grounds,
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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from using his or her property without the requirement for compensation.
C).

THE DECISION

The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell,
and Scalia. As a preliminary matter (and one of critical importance), the decision makes it clear that the Supreme Court, like the
California courts, did not decide whether the county's actions had
amounted to a taking of all use of the property in question. According to the Court, the taking question was not at issue; the only issue
was whether a compensation remedy is available if a taking of all
use of property has taken place. Thus, the Court simply assumed
that allegation to be true in order to reach the remedies question:
"We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance
at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether
. . .the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations."'
The Court proceeded to address whether the fifth amendment
requires that a temporary regulatory taking of all use of property be
compensated. Citing several earlier Supreme Court cases dealing
with temporary appropriation of private property by the government
during World War 11,10 the Court concluded that takings denying a
landowner "all use of his property" for a temporary period "are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation."" While recognizing the need for
flexibility in the regulatory process, the Court considered the fifth
amendment compensation requirement to apply both to temporary
regulatory takings of all use of property and to temporary physical
appropriations of property by the government. Thus, the Court held
that in any case, "where the government's activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was effective.""2
Once again, it is important to stress that the Court's decision
did not address whether the facts of the case constituted a taking of
all use of property, for which compensation was required. The Court
9. 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
10. Id. at 2387.
11. Id. at 2388.
12. Id. at 2389.
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itself emphasized this point before remanding the case to the California courts to decide that very issue:
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we
treat as true for purposes of our decision was that the ordinance in
question denied appellant all use of its property. We limit our
holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the
quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like which are not before us." 13
The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, with
whom Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in part. According to
the dissenting opinion, the Court "unnecessarily and imprudently"
assumed that the church had alleged an unconstitutional taking of
its property. All three justices agreed that precedents of the Supreme
Court made it clear that the type of regulatory program at issue in
the First English case could not constitute a taking, particularly in
the health and safety area: "[Tihe claim that the ordinance was a
taking of Lutherglen should be summarily rejected on its merits."'
All three Justices also argued that the plaintiff should have been required to pursue the invalidation claim in the California courts
before seeking Supreme Court review of the California procedures.
Justice Stevens also argued that the Court's opinion did not adequately distinguish between physical takings and regulatory takings,
and failed to make clear that:
[A] regulatory program that adversely affects property values does
not constitute a taking unless it destroys a major portion of the
property's value. . . .Unlike physical invasions, which are relatively rare and easily identifiable without making any economic
analysis, regulatory programs constantly affect property values in
countless ways, and only the most extreme regulations can constitute takings." 15
Justice Stevens expressed the view that, in the regulatory area, the
duration of the interference with the owner's use of the property is
only one factor among many that should be considered in determining whether a taking had taken place. According to Justice Stevens,
short-term regulatory interferences in the use of property rarely rise
13.
14.
15.

Id. (emphasis added.)
Id. at 2393.
Id. (citations omitted).
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to the level of takings. 16
D). EFFECT OF THE DECISION
A number of initial press reports concerning the First English
decision indicated that the case would have an immediate and adverse effect on local land use regulation, including historic preservation. If this is true, however, it is only because of a public misperception of what the decision actually says. As indicated above, the case,
while increasing the remedies available when governmental action
results in a taking of all use of private property, does not in any way
increase the possibility that a regulatory action will be construed by
the courts to deny all use of property, thus constituting a taking.
The courts have consistently upheld historic preservation ordinances under takings challenges, both on their face and in their application to individual cases. The Supreme Court itself has ruled that
preservation ordinances do not amount to a taking of private property. 7 In Penn Central the Supreme Court found "untenable" the
argument that a taking may be established simply by a property
owner showing he or she had been denied the ability to exploit a
property interest that had previously been thought to be available for
development. The Court concluded that the denial of use of a portion
of a property (the air rights over Grand Central Station in New
York) did not prevent the landowner from using the remainder of
the parcel "in a gainful fashion," and therefore did not amount to a
taking. Recent cases in the Supreme Court indicate that the Court
has not backed away from the rule laid down in the Penn Central
decision. Even in the First English case, the Court emphasized several times that its conclusions there only related to takings "of all
use of property" (emphasis added). 18 In addition, in an important
takings case this term the Court held that a land subsidence statute
in Pennsylvania did not amount to a taking of property for public
use, even though it required coal companies to leave a certain
amount of coal in place to support land surfaces. 1 9

E).

CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court's decision in First English will naturally instill a greater amount of caution among land use planners
16.

Id. at 2398.

17. See Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
18. E.g., 107 S. Ct. at 2385-89.
19. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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and regulators, any fear of increased liability resulting from historic
preservation regulations clearly appears to be unwarranted. As noted
in one recent article concerning the decision, the impact of First English is "more psychological than actual." The article describes the
reaction of urban planners and municipal law specialists as follows,
"In the past, they note, developers have seldom been able to prove
that a measure was so drastic as to effect a taking of property. The
Supreme Court decision they say, has not increased the number who
are likely to do so now."2 Consequently, the First English decision
should not discourage governments from enacting or applying historic preservation controls.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission IS UNLIKELY TO
AFFECT HISTORIC PRESERVATION CONTROLS

A).

INTRODUCTION

In the second major land-use decision issued within a threeweek period, the United States Supreme Court again upheld a challenge by property owners to governmental regulation of their land.
Once again, however, the Court's decision should have little effect on
historic preservation controls.
1 the Court conIn Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"
sidered the validity of a state requirement that, in return for permission to build on their property, the landowners grant the public a
right of access over a beachfront portion of their land. The Court
held that permit conditions, like other types of regulatory controls,
may be imposed by governments if they substantially further valid
governmental purposes. The Court, however, took a fairly strict view
as to whether the particular restriction in that case actually furthered the stated governmental purpose. It invalidated the permit
condition, ruling that the stated governmental purpose, access to the
beach, was not substantially furthered by the permit's condition for
an easement along the beach. The Nollan case indicates the Court's
intention to take a closer look at whether land-use controls actually
further the governmental interests it purports to promote. Nonetheless, historic preservation controls, particularly demolition and alteration restrictions, are tied directly to governmental interests explic20.
21.

N.Y. Times, June 14, 1987, at 5, col. 1. (Week in Review).
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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itly recognized by the courts. Consequently, the case, like the
Court's recent decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,"' should not discourage the application or enactment of historic preservation controls.

B).

FACTS

In early 1982, the Nollans decided to tear down a small bungalow on their beachfront lot in Ventura County, and replace the
structure with a three bedroom house." In accordance with California law governing development in coastal areas, they submitted an
application to the California Coastal Commission for a building permit. The commission concluded that the new house, by increasing
blockage of public view of the ocean, would discourage the public
from using beaches along the shoreline. The commission also concluded that development along the beach would burden the public's
right to travel along the beach, and that the easement would help to
alleviate that burden. Consequently, the commission conditioned issuance of the building permit on the Nollans' agreement to allow the
public an easement across a portion of their property along the high
tide line (beach property below that line is already owned by the
State). A similar condition had been imposed on 43 other properties
along the same tract of shorefront.
The Nollans filed suit in the California courts, alleging that the
imposition of the public access condition constituted a taking of their
property for public purposes without compensation, in violation of
the fifth amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth. The lower court agreed, concluding
that the California Coastal Commission had not produced sufficient
evidence that the construction project would burden public access to
the sea. The California Court of Appeals, however, sided with the
California Coastal Commission. The court ruled that the proposed
construction indirectly contributed to an increased need for public
access to the beach, and that the permit condition was sufficiently
related to the burden created by the project to withstand constitutional challenge. The Nollans appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the permit condition
was not reasonably related to the burden that construction on their
22. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
23. At the time the permit application was filed, the Nollans did not actually own the
property, but leased it with an option to purchase. The Nollans exercised that option by the
time their legal challenge was heard in the courts.
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property would impose on public access to the beach. The California
Coastal Commission in turn argued that the permit condition would
ease the additional congestion caused by the construction.
C).

THE DECISION

The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. The opinion began by exploring the nature of the
restriction imposed on the Nollans. The Court concluded that the
access requirement imposed by the California Coastal Commission
would clearly have been a taking (as, in effect, a physical invasion of
a portion of their land through denial of their exclusive occupation)
if it had been imposed by the state directly, rather than in the context of a permit condition. The question raised in the Nollan case,
however, was whether the restriction would constitute a taking if imposed as a permit condition.
In addressing this question, the Court took the position that permit conditions, even those that would effectively result in physical
intrusions, are to be reviewed under the same general standards as
are other types of regulatory controls: such restrictions are permissible if they substantially further legitimate governmental purposes
and do not deny landowners the economically viable use of their
property. The Court based its analysis on, and cited with approval,
the 1978 decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 4 [w]hich upheld the application of New York City's historic
preservation ordinance, and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 5 a decision
upholding a California open-space zoning ordinance. These decisions
were also cited as illustrating governmental interests that had previously been recognized by the Court as clearly legitimate (specifically
"landmark preservation," and "scenic zoning"). Turning to the circumstances of the Nollans' case, the court assumed as valid the
state's asserted interest in overcoming the visual barrier to coastal
access created by the Nollans' construction project. It then focused
on a single question: Whether that governmental interest was in fact
"substantially" furthered by the permit condition imposed on the
Nollans.
The Court took the position that a permit condition, like an outright permit denial, would not be valid if it failed to further the gov24.
25.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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ernmental interest used to justify it. 6 Thus, the court expressed the
view that the public access condition imposed on the Nollans would
have to reasonably relate to the burden imposed by their proposed
construction. It was on these specific grounds that the Court invalidated the permit condition. According to the majority opinion, the
burden imposed by the Nollans' development on access to the coast
would not be alleviated by the requirement for "lateral access"
across the Nollans' beachfront.2 7 The Court found it "impossible to
understand" how public access along the beach could help to remedy
any additional congestion imposed by the Nollans' new house. The
Court also stated that, if the condition could not be justified as responding to the burden imposed by the development, it could not be
justified on the alternative grounds that it was a "good idea," or because the public interest would somehow be served.
There were three dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan, in a
lengthly criticism of the majority opinion (joined by Justice Marshall), characterized the California Coastal Commission's permit
condition as a "reasonable effort to respond to intensified development along the California coast."' 28 He described the position taken
by the majority as a "cramped" standard of "precision" for the exercise of a state's police power, and strongly denounced that standard
as demanding "a degree of exactitude" stronger than that required
in previous Supreme Court precedents concerning the reasonableness
of state regulation. Justice Brennan also argued that, in fact, the
condition imposed by the California Coastal Commission was properly designed to mitigate the encroaching nature of private use immediately adjacent to the public beach area. The Brennan view was
echoed in a dissent by Justice Blackmun, which criticized the "eye
for an eye" mentality of the majority opinion.2 9 Justice Stevens, in a
separate dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, took the opportunity to
criticize once again the Court's opinion in First English. He expressed his discomfort with the combination of a strict standard of
financial liability, as set out in First English, with the strict standard
30
of review used in Nollan.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

107 S. Ct. at 3147.
Id. at 3149.
Id. at 3151.
Id. at 3162.
Id. at 3163.
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EFFECT OF THE DECISION

The Nollan decision clearly validated the use of permit conditions as regulatory tools, even where those conditions would otherwise amount to physical intrusions. The limits applicable to such
controls are the same limits laid down in previous decisions of the
Court, including the "landmark" Penn Central case. The restrictions
must substantially further valid governmental purposes, and may not
deny the affected landowner the economically viable use of his or her
land. At the same time, as is made clear in the dissenting opinions,
the Court appears to be sounding a relatively strict standard of review in examining whether land-use controls meet these constitutional limitations. The review of the condition imposed on the Nollans required a close match between the burden imposed by the
restriction and the developmental burden it was intended to offset.
The Court's approach gives little or no deference to the judgment of
state agencies responsible for determining what controls are reasonable in any given case.
Two factors indicate that the strict level of review used by the
Court in Nollan may be limited to those cases in which the regulatory control involved would amount to a physical appropriation of
property. First, the Court went out of its way in the beginning of the
opinion to classify the permit condition as equivalent to a physical
occupation of a portion of the Nollans' property; and second, the
Court explicitly stated that it was "inclined to be particularlycareful" (emphasis added) where a permit condition requires an actual
"conveyance" of property (i.e. an easement), due to the increased
risk that the restriction is, in effect, a subterfuge for an uncompensated taking of property. In any event, regardless of whether the
strict standard of review used in the Nollan decision is to be applied
to other regulatory devices, those responsible for enacting or applying historic preservation ordinances should not be greatly concerned.
First, the Nollan decision itself reemphasized Penn Central's recognition of historic preservation as a legitimate governmental interest,
for which regulatory controls are appropriate. Second, the controls
included in historic preservation ordinances, generally those limiting
demolition or alteration of designated properties without advance review and approval, are invariably tied closely to those legitimate governmental interests. The only note of caution that needs to be
sounded is this: Where conditions are imposed on the approval of
certificates of appropriateness or similar historic preservation controls, the applicable administrative body should ensure that those
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conditions actually relate to the negative effect that the proposed alteration will have on the historic, architectural, or aesthetic character of the property or district involved. A common-sense approach to
regulatory controls is likely to prevent the opportunity for legal challenges by property owners.

E).

CONCLUSION

As noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, the Nollan decision, like the Supreme Court's decision on First English, is likely to
discourage "creative" regulatory solutions to land-use problems.3 '
This is indeed unfortunate. As Justice Stevens writes, "the public
interest is served by encouraging state agencies to exercise considerable flexibility in responding to private desires for development in a
way that threatens the preservation of public resources."32 Nonetheless, the Nollan decision, again, like First English, should not have
any major effect on the majority of land-use controls. Even under a
relatively strict standard of review, such controls are unlikely to be
successfully challenged, as they have been designed to meet specific
burdens imposed on valid governmental interests. This is particularly
true with respect to historic preservation controls which controls are
designed to respond directly to activities that adversely affect interests recognized by the courts as substantial and legitimate.

31.
32.

Id. at 3154.
Id. at 3163.

